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Abstract – In the last three decades, the great powers have become 
increasingly dependent on satellite communication (SATCOM), 
very high frequency (VHF), and ultra-high frequency (UHF) 
providing high bandwidth line of sight (LOS) communications. 
These military communication channels lack resilience because an 
EW campaign can affect both VHF and SATCOM simultaneously. 
The 1940s preferred spectrum, high frequency (HF), with its 
different propagation patterns, offers an opportunity for military 
communication resiliency in the 21st century. The concept of 
retrograding could give an operational advantage and create the 
ability to sustain communication in electronic warfare (EW) 
saturated environment.                  
Keywords – communications, resiliency, defense, emergency 
management, retrofitting, electronic warfare.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defense forces, coast guard, homeland security, and 
emergency management agencies have, during the last 
decades, become dependent and reliant on stable 
communications providing ample bandwidth to support 
operations and information flow within the organization. The 
current deployed tactical and operational communication 
networks are highly dependent upon line-of-sight (LOS) 
communication utilizing very high frequency (VHF), ultra-
high frequency (UHF), and higher frequencies. The 
information grids are tailored by a network of radio, 
datastream, radio links, and satellite communication 
(SATCOM), all requiring a near to line-of-sight for sufficient 
propagation, bandwidth, and transmission quality.  
Meanwhile, the efforts to disrupt and degrade military 
communications are equally focused on the VHF/UHF bands 
that are prevailing for tactical and operational radio and data 
traffic. Within the last decade, especially Russia and China, 
have made a dedicated effort to radically improve their ability 
in electronic warfare (EW) and create effects in the 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) in the pursuit to deny or 
degrade targeted communication channels. Parallel with this 
development SATCOM communication risks have increased 
as several states developed electromagnetic, kinetic, and cyber 
ability to disrupt these communications.      
  A potential future conflict with a capable near-peer 
adversary; Russia or PR China are notable in that they have 
heavily invested in electromagnetic spectrum warfare 
capacity, and are capable of employing electronic warfare 
throughout their force structure [1]. Electronic warfare 
elements deployed within theaters of operation threaten to 
degrade, disrupt, or deny VHF, UHF, and SATCOM 
communication.  
In this scenario, HF radio is a viable backup mode of 
communication.  The ability retrograde to HF, commonly 
referred to as shortwave, creates resilience in an EW-saturated 
operational environment. The HF networks provide satisfying 
bandwidth if the focus is to transmit operational information, 
command, and control. 
II. HISTORICAL PATH 
The first globally operating military force, with a presence 
on all continents, was the British Army and the Royal Navy.  
They were instrumental in the growth of the British colonial 
possessions. Once the British Empire was established, there 
was a need to communicate with British colonies and direct a 
British military presence. This paved the way for financing 
and incentives to rapidly create a network of undersea cables 
that linked the colonies with Great Britain in the 1850s and 
1860s [2]. The telegraphy, as a form of domestic 
communication, had followed the unprecedented increase in 
transportation infrastructure in the early 1800s. The US 
railway system in 1830 was 40 miles, and by 1860, 920 miles 
of railroad been laid down [3]. The telegraph lines followed 
the railroads, and during the American Civil War, 1861-1865. 
Both sides used the telegraph to instruct and command units 
during the engagement. 
In comparison to landline, the earlier undersea cables 
struggled with extremely low bandwidth down to a word a 
minute, which increased over time. The great powers of the 
time, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Russia, 
and Germany had in the early 1900s established land-based 
networks of wireless telegraph stations. At the outbreak of 
World War One, the great powers of the day had outfitted their 
larger warships with wireless telegraphs using low frequency 
(LF), also called longwave, and medium frequency (MF), 
known as medium wave, providing communication 80 – 200 
km between warships. Due to the size and electricity 
consumption of the early wireless telegraph, the military 
wireless equipment for armies had a limited range, and the 
early airborne wireless telegraphs had ranges that were less 
than 2 km.             
   The introduction of shortwave in the 1920s gave 
governments, companies, and individuals the ability to 
communicate over unprecedented distances at a low cost [4]. 
The innovation of more efficient transmitters also made it 
possible to design and produce mobile two-way radio [4]. 
During World War Two, the Korean War, and the War in 
Vietnam, HF was a standard way of communicating that was 
gradually taken over by VHF during the War in Vietnam. The 
successful launch of Telstar [5] in 1962 and the evolution of 
satellite communication during late 1960 changed the flow of 
communications [6]. In the early 1960s, HF and cable were 
utilized to communication to the US or higher commands in 
theater.  Post-Vietnam and the early 1980s, tactical VHF, radio 
link, and SATCOM were utilized for communication to higher 
commands. From the 1980s, this development towards 
VHF/UHF LOS communications has accelerated.  Since the 
early 1990s HF is rarely utilized by ground forces.  Even if HF 
equipment is fielded it is seldom used. However 
, HF continues to be used for limited tasks within navies 
and air forces.      
III. THE BANDWIDTH ADDICTION 
The vast majority of the world’s modern armies’ ability to 
employ high-frequency HF radio systems has atrophied 
significantly since the Cold War as NATO, and numerous 
other countries transitioned to counterinsurgency operations. 
An era of abundant and close-to-uninterrupted bandwidth is 
coming to an end as the future threat landscape, and potential 
conflicts will likely involve aggressive EW, counter-
SATCOM [7], and anti-satellite measures [8]. Also, satellites 
can be destroyed by cascading events due to debris from 
kinetic anti-satellite attacks on other spaceborne assets [9] or 
space debris already existing in orbit [10]. 
After two decades with the uncontested spectrum, the US 
Armed Forces, and a vast majority of the world’s modern 
armies, have been used to having available bandwidth, 
communications, and the ability to switch between 
communication channels with limited interruption and 
excellent quality. The counterinsurgency operations have 
provided rear operational areas with a stable energy supply, 
enabling the ability to set up satellite and radio links, and 
reliable communication channels to higher commands, air 
assets, medical resources, and the logistics chain.  
Any potential near-peer adversaries are fully aware of our 
dependence on these communications channels and how the 
loss of these channels would severely impact the modern way 
of warfighting. Satellite communications are especially 
vulnerable for several reasons.  First, the satellites transmit at 
lower power levels, making them easier to jam. Second, 
weather and space weather (solar flares) can negatively impact 
satellite communications. Third, the compact and fragile 
design of the satellite itself makes them subject to failure due 
to space debris or potentially an attack from an adversary’s 
satellite.  Finally, the satellites can be challenging to upgrade 
and could, over time, be vulnerable to cyber-attacks.  
William J. Lynn, III, the former US Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, stated in the summer of 2011 [11]: “The willingness 
of states to interfere with satellites in orbit has serious 
implications for our national security. Space systems enable 
our modern way of war. They allow our warfighters to strike 
with precision, to navigate with accuracy, to communicate 
with certainty, and to see the battlefield with clarity. Without 
them, many of our most important military advantages 
evaporate.” 
       
Even if the US today is dominant in military satellite 
communication, several other countries are quickly building a 
spaceborne information infrastructure, where Russia, China, 
and India have taken the lead.  
 
The knowledge that the high-bandwidth, almost always 
available, networks will likely be at least degraded in a future 
conflict should drive a cultural shift towards a more frugal 
usage of communication that reemphasizes the exchange to 
what is mission essential.    
 
In the past, the radiotelegraph operators, and the 
organizations that utilized the Morse code, solved the lack of 
bandwidth by compressing messages. As an example, “2 
GERSUB 10 NM SSW GIB” transmitted in a few words reads 
two German submarines are sighted ten nautical miles South-
South-West of Gibraltar. During WW I and WW II trained 
radiotelegraphists were able to send and receive information 
that managed ground, air, and naval operations over vast 
spaces. The notion that current operations need megabits per 
second in available bandwidth is a sign that today’s armies, 
coast guard, homeland security, and emergency management 
have grown accustomed to having access to high bandwidth 
and adjusted the processes to require these digital streams. The 
counterinsurgency battlefield, with bases and forward 
operating bases with a full array of information systems and 
communication infrastructure, close to the area of operation, 
was able to deliver high bandwidth close to the actual 
engagement. The HF networks give a reduced bandwidth for 
data transfer, even if it as limited as a 1990s Hayes 9600 baud 
dialup modem, but that would be enough if the exchange is 
compressed information that is mission essential.  The Harris 
PRC-150 HF radio operates at 9600 bits per second using the 
STANAG 4539 NATO standard protocol. 
IV. REEMERGED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
The recent change from a strategic focus on 
counterinsurgency to near-peer and peer-conflicts also extend 
the areas of operations. The counterinsurgency operational 
environment allowed the establishment of communication 
hubs in “safe zones” close to the battlefield. Even if these 
nations, where counterinsurgency operations occurred, lacked 
a national communications infrastructure, the military 
communication infrastructure could be established and sustain 
the operation. As General Milley stated [12], “Many of the 
conditions we have grown accustomed to over the past 
eighteen years will not exist in future battles. Control of the air 
will be contested; Forward Operating Bases will not provide a 
safe haven; units will be continuously targeted by enemy fires; 
and communications and navigation systems will be 
intermittent at best.”   
 
Apart from the Syrian civil war and the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine, the conflicts the last two decades has had an 
uncontested spectrum and access to VHF/UHF with no 
adversarial EW assets present. These conditions will likely 
change, especially in a peer or near-peer conflict.  
 
The future operations could occur in areas with limited 
satellite coverage to enable military satellite communication 
over a military space information grid or leased channels from 
a commercial operator using mobile satellite services (MSS). 
In that case, even with no present EW or interference, 
SATCOM can be unreliable and intermittent.   
V. THE STATE OF HF (SHORTWAVE) COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Currently, the competency with HF radio systems within the 
US Army is limited; however, there is a strong case to train 
and ensure readiness for the utilization of HF communication. 
Even in EMS-denied environments, HF radios can provide 
stable, beyond-line-of-sight communication permitting the 
ability to initiate a prompt global strike. While HF radio 
equipment is also vulnerable to electronic attack, it can be 
difficult to target due to near vertical incident skywave signal 
propagation. This propagation method provides the ability to 
reflect signals off the ionosphere in an EMS-contested 
environment, establishing communications beyond the line of 
sight. Due to the signal path, the ability to target an HF 
transmitter is much more complicated than transmissions from 
VHF and UHF radios that transmit line of sight ground waves. 
 
One concern is the HF capacity, once seen as obsolete and 
replaced by VHF/UHF, has been removed to free up space and 
lower weight in several fixed-wing, helicopter, and vehicle 
assets. In some cases, versions of a particular platform can 
differ in the ability to communicate using HF. Where the older 
version had the HF capable radios delivered from the factory 
in the 1990s; meanwhile, the updated version had HF radios 
removed. The removal of HF equipment requires retrofitting 
HF ability back into the platform. There are needs to 
retrograde by adding, modifying, and updating the HF 
capacity in these platforms.  Even if the equipment is fielded 
to the fighting formations, the ability across the branches will 
be fragmented and not uniform unless a DOD plan is in place 
to ensure their compatibility. 
VI. RETROGRADE FOR RESILIENCE  
The Russian investment in electronic warfare capabilities are 
significant, and electronic warfare units are organic to any 
Russian formation from the brigade combat team and higher. 
This can provide a significant strategic advantage in the early 
stage of a conflict. The Russian formations can engage cyber 
and electromagnetic effects already in the “Initial Period of 
War,” within the grey zone before there is an open conflict 
[13].   
 
The US and allied ground forces can offset initial strategic 
inferiority with airpower, naval power, and global strike 
abilities, but this is dependent on communication channels 
between ground forces and joint assets [13]. The focus of the 
adversary’s electronic warfare is to deny US communications. 
One alternative is to retrograde and utilize high-frequency 
communications, which was the communication channel of 
World War II and the Korean War. High-frequency radio 
waves propagate by bouncing off the ionosphere allowing for 
beyond the line of sight communications. Due to the skywave 
propagation pattern, it is more difficult for the enemy to 
perform spectrum denial. Modern HF equipment is 
approximately the same in weight and size compared to VHF 
equipment and does not hinder usage by dismounted troops 
[14].  
 
Even in EMS (electromagnetic spectrum)-denied 
environments, HF radios can provide stable, beyond-line-of-
sight communication permitting the ability to initiate a prompt 
global strike. While HF (high frequency) radio equipment is 
also vulnerable to electronic attack, it can be difficult to target 
due to near vertical incident skywave signal propagation. This 
propagation method provides the ability to reflect signals off 
the ionosphere in an EMS-contested environment, establishing 
communications beyond the line of sight within a regional 
area. Due to the signal path, the ability to target an HF 
transmitter is more complicated than transmissions from VHF 
and UHF radios that transmit line of sight ground waves. Also, 
modern digital transmission modes allow for communications 
to occur at low power levels making it more difficult for the 
adversary to detect these signals. 
 
Alarmingly, as hostile near-peer adversaries reemerge, it is 
necessary to re-establish HF alternatives should very-high-
frequency, ultra-high frequency, or SATCOM come under 
attack and no longer remain viable options for battlefield 
communications. HF communication has its inherent 
weaknesses and challenges. Common challenges are antenna 
size and configuration and propagation changes throughout the 
day and night due to changes in the ionosphere.  Still, it does 
not remove the fact that it can provide communications 
beyond the line of sight, which can serve as an alternative in 
critical junctures. By stepping back and being able to 
retrograde to HF as a resiliency measure, the US is increasing 
communication redundancy. This also adds an asymmetric 
advantage when the adversary has to divert EW assets with a 
different set of requirements to address the HF ability.  
 
HF radio signals propagate by bouncing off the ionosphere 
and require more resources to disrupt and degrade. The HF 
propagation patterns would send signals to broader areas, 
which allows for the adversary to hear the signal and direct 
countermeasures. Still, it also will enable parts of the 
propagation to pass through enough to get communication 
established even in a high saturated EW environment. HF 
jamming equipment requires more energy and has a significant 
signature, which enables US and NATO neutralizing attacks 
with stand-off weaponry and anti-radiation missiles to be 
successful. The Russian Armed Forces utilize HF 
communications as well, and a broad and unrestricted HF 
jamming can degrade and disrupt their own communications.  
There is also a possibility that the HF transmission propagates 
in a way it cannot be heard by the adversary providing 
undisrupted communication when utilizing low probability of 
intercept (LPI) and low probability of detection (LPD) 
techniques. On the other hand, line-of-sight communications 
have a more narrow propagation channel, which allows the 
EW attacker higher certainty that communications are denied 
or degraded.   
         
There is limited competency with HF radio systems within all 
the branches; however, there is a strong case to train and 
ensure readiness for the utilization of HF communication. 
Even in EMS (electromagnetic spectrum) denied 
environments, HF radios can provide stable, beyond-line-of-
sight communication permitting the ability to initiate a prompt 
global strike. While HF radio equipment is also vulnerable to 
electronic attack, it can be difficult to target when configured 
to use near vertical incident skywave signal propagation. This 
high-angle take-off propagation method provides the ability to 
refract signals off the ionosphere in an EMS-contested 
environment, establishing communications beyond the line of 
sight out to 400 miles. Due to the high-angle signal path, the 
ability to direction find (DF) and target an HF transmitter is 
more complicated than transmissions from VHF and UHF 
radios that transmit line-of-sight ground waves.  Also, Russian 
listening posts located outside of the 400-mile radius cannot 
intercept the communications. The recent digital modes 
utilizing 3G Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) technology 
allows for digital communication at lower power levels than 
what was previously required for voice. In addition, this mode 
simplifies operation by automatically selecting the optimal 
frequency for communication to other HF nodes in the 
network.  This technology allows for tac chat messaging along 
with digital voice within a 3G ALE network.  Using lower 
power is a crucial advantage when trying to prevent direction 
finding, and adding encryption to the digital signal helps 
prevent signal interception. 
 
The HF spectrum offers low-cost opportunities to increase unit 
survivability and increase battlefield effectiveness by 
achieving a stealthier communication channel that potential 
adversaries will have difficulties to find the source of the 
transmission. HF should be included in any unit’s 
communication PACE (Primary Alternate Contingency 
Emergency) plan as the emergency method at a minimum.  
The expense to attain an improved HF-readiness level is low 
compared to other defense initiatives, yet with a high return on 
investment. In the US, the equipment (Harris AN/PRC-150) 
has already been fielded to maneuver units, and foreign forces 
have similar equipment already purchased, which enables 
these forces to be retrograde to generate resiliency.  
 
After almost three decades of limited interest in ground forces’ 
HF communications, there are knowledge gaps to fill to ensure 
the optimal techniques, tactics, and procedures. Science and 
technology have during these decades advanced, therefore 
there multiple opportunities to cost-effectively enhance and 
improve the HF communication ability, especially pushing 
targeting data through HF communications. The revival of HF 
communications as a resilience measure will posture the Joint 
Force, and its branches, in a state of higher readiness for future 
conflicts. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
In the last three decades, the great powers have become 
increasingly dependent on satellite communication 
(SATCOM) [15], very high frequency (VHF), and ultra-high 
frequency (UHF), providing high bandwidth line of sight 
(LOS) communications. These military communication 
channels lack resilience because an EW campaign can affect 
both VHF and SATCOM simultaneously. The 1940s preferred 
spectrum, HF, with its different propagation pattern, offers an 
opportunity for military communication resiliency in the 21st 
century.      
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